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BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
Appellants include in their brief and make a part 
thereof under appendix No. 3, a portion of the findings of 
the trial court in the Will case of Wilda Gail Swan, from 
pages 8 to 17 inclusive. It is apparent from a reading of 
the findings that not only those findings set out by appellants 
in their brief but all of the findings are necessary to be 
considered in order to present fairly to this court the record 
made in the will case. 
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Without -belaboring points which may not be of vital 
importance, we deem it advisable to mention the following 
two apparently erroneous statements which appear in the 
"Statement of Facts" of Appellants' Brief: 
l. The statement: "The said com plant failed to state 
a cause of action against Ada Bridge" (Page 5 of said brief). 
This is a bald statement of a conclusion which is not borne 
out by the facts. Furthermore, if there were any such 
failure in the complaint, it was cured by the evidence in the 
case, upon which the Trial Court based its conclusions and 
judgment. 
2. The statement: "The Supreme Court did not hold 
that the Will and Codicils were null and void." (Page 6 of 
said brief). We need only refer to the Court's decision in 
the Swan case, 293 P. ( 2d), 682, at page 690, where this 
Court held: ". . . . the findings of the trial court must be 
affirmed," and one of these findings (No. 33) held that 
"the second codicil was therefore the product of undue in-
fluence exercised by Grant Macfarlane and Daniel Kos· 
topulos, and should therefore be declared null and void." 
A substantial part of appellants' brief is devoted to 
argument by which appellants attempt to show that if the de-
cision in the case had been appealed on behalf of appellant 
Ada Bridge, the Sureme Court would have reversed the trial 
court's decision as the same affected this appellant. This 
argument is based on the false presumption that there was 
unquestionably an agreement between appellants and respon-
dents by which respondents agreed to represent appellants 
on an appeal from the trial court's decision in the Will case. 
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In the granting of respondents' Motion for Summary 
Judgment the effect of that decision, the judgment 
being a summary judgment and there being no find-
ings, is that the lower court determined there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact made by the 
pleadings, and that as a matter of law this Honorable Court 
would not have reversed the lower court in the Will case 
had an appeal been taken on behalf of appellant Ada 
Bridge, or the court concluded that the allegations of th~ 
complaint as to an oral agreement does not make a triable 
issue as to that point, or both. Respondents also having 
pleaded as a defense, that appellants were guilty of laches 
and therefore estopped from asserting their claim, the lower 
court could have so concluded in its granting the motion for 
summary judgment. 
The lower court had before it in the instant case, the 
record made at the trial of the Will case, and it being evi-
dent from the allegations of appellants' complaint that there 
was no meeting of minds as to terms of an agreement, nothing 
could be determined by a full dress trial of the case which 
was not already before the lower court by the pleadings and 
the motion of respondents for summary judgment. 
In presenting argument on the case respondents will 
treat the same under two points. 
POINT I. 
THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO 
ON THE PART OF RESPONDENTS TO APPEAL THE 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
WILDA GAIL SWAN WILL CASE ON BEHALF OF AP-
PELLANTS. IF HOWEVER, THE HONORABLE COURT 
IS NOT IN AGREEMENT WITH THIS CONTENTION 
OF RESPONDENTS BUT DETERMINES THAT SUCH 
AN AGREEMENT WAS ENTERED INTO THEN AP-
PELLANTS FAILED TO PERFORM THEIR PART OF 
THE AGREEMENT WITHIN THE TIME WHEN AN AP-
PEAL COULD HAVE BEEN TIMELY FILED, AND 
THEREFORE NO CAUSE OF ACTION EXISTS AS 
AGAINST RESPONDENTS. 
Appellant Ada Bridge was named as a beneficiary in 
the second codicil, and the will and codicil having been ad-
mitted to probate by order of the court this appellant was a 
defendant in the will contest case. Appellant Joseph L. 
Bridge was not named in the will or in either codicil and 
there is no allegation in the complaint even remotely showing 
that this party has a cause of action against respondents. 
The allegation contained in the complaint on which 
appellants rely as constituting an agreement by which re-
spondents were to represent appellants on an appeal of the 
Will case is as follows: 
(Taken from paragraph 2. of the amended complaint) 
That thereafter, on or about the 21st day of May, 
1954, the plaintiffs herein, ~nd defendant in said 
contest action, went to the office of the defendants, 
Backman, Backman & Clark, and then and there en· 
tered into a verbal agreement with the said defendants 
and particularly LeGrand P. Backman to appeal the 
aforesaid judgment of the Salt Lake County District 
Court, civil action N. 96977 to the Supreme Court of 
the State of Utah; that plaintiffs informed the said 
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defendant that they did not have the cash to pay for 
attorney's fees on appeal and asked defendant Le 
Grand P. Backman if he would take the matter 
on appeal for a percentage of the recovery, 
which said defendant agreed to do, informing 
plaintiffs that that the usual fee was one-third ( 1/3) 
of the recovery, but that he would not charge plain-
tiffs that much, but would charge them a fair fee, 
which plaintiffs agreed to pay and defendant, Le-
Grand P. Backman agreed to receive for his services 
in making the appeal for himself and for his said 
firm, the other defendants herein; that said defen-
dant, LeGrand P. Backman informed the plaintiffs 
that they would have to pay approximately the sum 
of ·$100 for the cost of printing briefs on appeal, but. 
did not ask for said sum to be advanced then and 
there, which sum plaintiffs agreed to pay, and did 
pay, as hereinafter set forth. 
Now assuming for the purpose of argument that the 
contentions of appellants that an agreement was entered into 
under and by which respondents agreed to take an appeal on 
behalf of appellants were true, the attention of this Honorable 
Court is directed to the fact that by appellants' own admission 
they agreed on May 21, 1954 to pay toward the cost of print-
ing briefs on the appeal the sum of $100. Appellants allege 
that they did pay the sum of $100, and respondents do not 
dispute the fact that $100 was paid by appellants, but re-
spondents do dispute the fact that the $100 was paid for the 
printing of briefs. It is recognized however, that on a mo-
tion for summary judgment the court must take the conten-
tions of appellants as being true. But when was that .$:100 
paid by appellants? By their own admissions as con-
tained in paragraph 6 of their complaint it was paid on 
October 20th, 1954. That was over three months beyond 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
the time for the timely filing of notice of appeal in the Will 
case. 
Appellants would have this Honorable Court believe 
that even though they had not paid respondent, LeGrand P. 
Backman, one cent before the appeal period had expired, on 
the original case which took several days of trial in the lower 
court, neither had they paid a cent toward the cost of a 
transcript, and not a cent toward the cost of appeal, nor 
had they paid any part of the $100 which they admit they 
had agreed, prior to the expiration of the period, to pay 
for cost of briefs, still respondent, LeGrand P. Backman 
was obligated under the alleged agreement to file a timely 
notice of appeal ,on behalf of appellants and to advance the 
costs of getting the appeal before the Supreme Court, this 
under an agreement which appellants admit was not per-
formed by them within the time in which a timely appeal 
could have been taken. And how was that $100 paid by 
appellants? To the office of respondent LeGrand P. Back-
man, without his knowledge, at the time it was paid. That 
payment, it is clearly evident was made for one purpose 
and that was to attempt to make a case against respondents. 
Appellants further allege, in paragraph 6 of their 
complaint that respondents agreed, on behalf of appellants, 
with counsel for Macfarlane, to pay the sum of $50 for the 
cost of the record on appeal, but did appellants allege they 
paid the same? They do not, they could not so allege be-
cause they did not pay this cost either. 
Now let us take another look at the terms of the alleged 
oral agreement on which appellants rely. Appellants allege 
that they had no cash to pay for attorney's fees, and upon 
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inquiring of respondent, LeGrand P. Backman if he would 
take the case on a percentage of the recovery, he said the 
usual fee was a one-third of the recovery but that he would 
not charge that much but would charge a fair fee, which 
plaintiffs agreed to pay and defendant, LeGrand P. Back-
man agreed to receive. We suppose appellants will contend 
that anything up to the one-third would be fair and that 
there is no uncertainty in the amount because it could be 
anything one-third or under; but who was to fix the fair fee, 
the attorney or the client? Who was to determine when 
settlement was to be affected if a settlement should be 
offered? Was the same fee to be paid whether the case was 
settled out of court or through an appeal with the chance 
that the case might be remanded for a new trial? Was the 
agreement with the law firm or with respondent, LeGrand 
P. Backman? With all of these uncertainties how could such 
an agreement as that contended for be enforced even if 
respondent were to admit same. Who was to pay the court 
costs? Was the contingency to apply to the whole amount 
or after costs were paid and deducted? 
Take the agreement as alleged, in the reverse, assume 
that such an agreement had been entered into, and the case 
had been determined or settled in favor of appellants, and 
respondents were not paid and were obliged to proceed with 
action on the oral agreement as alleged to recover their 
fees, would the court hold that such an agreement was en-
forceable? We think not. Most certainly the court would 
be called upon to spell into the agreement many of the 
terms hereinabove pointed out. In fact the court would be 
called upon to make the contract if one was to be enforced. 
In 7 CJS, Attorney & Client, page 1063 it is said: 
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"An atttorney is not entitled to a percentage of the 
amount recovered by his client in the absence of an 
express contract to that effect." 
In Fleming v Phinizy, 134 SE 814, 35 Ga. App. 792. 
Note 39, in 7 CJS, Attorney & Client, page 1063 the law is 
stated as follows: 
"Where services were rendered without any 
agreement whatever as to the amount or terms of 
compensation, the attorney is not acting under a 
contract for a contingent fee, and a letter by the at-
torney to the client stating that a certain sum would 
be a reasonable amount to charge for his services and 
adding that a rate of not less than five per cent nor 
more than ten would be reasonable and customary 
does not convert the original agreement into a con-
tract for a contingent fee." 
If such an agreement does not constitute a contract for a 
contingent fee in favor of the attorney neither would such a 
contract constitute a contingent fee agreement in favor of 
the client. 
So too In Modern Woodmen of America v Arnkens, 
192 N. E. 706, 99 Ind. App. 344 it was said: 
"Statements of a fraternal benefit society's secre-
tary to an attorney after its general counsel's refusal 
of the attorney's offers to disclose information con-
cerning a fraudulent death claim for stated sums that 
the general counsel would do what was fair and the 
secretary would see that the attorney received a rea· 
sonable fee, if he disclosed the information, was 
held riot to establish an employment contract entitling 
the attorney to recover his fee." 
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Contingent fee agreements between attorney and client 
are not looked upon with favor by the courts, 7 CJS, Attor-
ney & Client, p. l 063. Therefore it would be most unfair 
for a court to impose upon an attorney such an agreement 
unless it is clearly shown without any question of doubt 
that an agreement had been entered into. 
If there had been a contingent fee agreement entered 
into between appellants and respondents would it not be 
most likely that the same would have been reduced to 
writing with all of the terms spelled out? Respondents are 
mindful of the fact that such agreements may be made 
and enforced even if oral but the burden is on the proponent 
of the agreement to prove the same in all respects. 
In the instant case the burden is on appellants to prove 
the agreement of employment and the respondents' negli-
gence; there is no presumption that respondents were negli-
gent. This is the rule of law as stated in 7CJS, Attorney 
and Client, Sec. 157 at page 999 wherein it is said: 
"There is no presumption that an attorney has been 
guilty of a want of care, arising merely from his 
failure to be successful in an undertaking; on the 
contrary, he is presumed to have discharged his 
duty, whether legal or moral, until the contrary has 
been made to appear. Therefore, a client who sues 
an attorney for negligence must prove the attorney's 
employment, his negligence, and that it proximately 
caused the loss complained of.", (Italics supplied) 
There is no showing of bad faith on the part of respon-
dents in the instant case. There is no contention on the part 
of appellants that respondents agreed in the original employ-
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ment agreement to appeal the Will case if appellants were 
not successful in the trial of that case. There is no question 
but that respondent, LeGrand P. Backman was employed by 
appellants in the defense of the Will case and that he was to 
be compensated for his services; this is admitted by appel-
lants, therefore appellants must rely on the agreement as 
alleged or fail in their case. 
As heretofore stated there is no implied agreement that 
respondent LeGrand P. Backman was obligated to carry on 
the case for appellants to the Supreme Court in the Will 
case and it appears that it is not contended so by appellants, 
however should there be any question as to this point ref-
erence is made to the case of Sandall v Sandall, 57 U. 150, 
193 P. 1093, 15 ALR 620 wherein our own court has held 
that an attorney representing a defendant in an action has 
no obligation to carry on for the client beyond the entry 
of judgment unless a new and independent agreement is 
made for such additional services. 
Appellants rely upon an agreement which they admit 
they themselves did not perform within the period of 
time when their rights could have been protected. They 
must stand or fall on that agreement, this provided the court 
is first convinced that there was an agreement. 
POINT II. 
EVEN IF AN AGREEMENT HAD BEEN ENTERED 
INTO BY RESPONDENT, LEGRAND P. BACKMAN TO 
APPEAL, THE APPELLATE COURT WOULD NOT 
HAVE REVERSED THE LOWER COURT AS TO APPEL-
LANT ADA BRIDGE. 
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It is interesting to note that had the appeal of Ada 
Bridge been presented to the Supreme Court, this Honorable 
Court would have had before it the record of the same 
facts and evidence as it had before it in the Kostopulos ap-
peal from the decision of the trial court on the first codicil. 
In the Kostopulos appeal as the same affects the first 
~odicil the court found as follows, Finding No. 26: 
The court finds that when the first codicil was 
made on February 20, 1950, Gail Swan did not 
have mental capacity to make a testamentary disposi-
tion of her property because her childish and im-
mature mind was unable to resist, and could not 
resist, the domination and influence of Macfarlane. 
The court further finds that said codicil was produced 
by the undue influence of Macfarlane. 
And Conclusion of law No. 4 is as follows: 
When Wilda Gail Swan signed the purported first 
codicil on February 20, 1950, she was so far dom-
inated by the influence of Grant Macfarlane that 
he was able to and did substitute his will for hers. 
The codicil was therefore a product of undue influ-
ence exercised by Grant Mcfarlane at the time he pre-
pared the codicil and at the time she signed the same. 
Said codicil is and should be declared null and void. 
The first codicil in which Kostopolus was named as a 
beneficiary was, under finding No. 20, signed under the 
same circumstances as surrounded the signing of the will of 
May 2, 1947. Gail Swan went to Macfarlane's law office 
alone. Macfarlane there drew the first codicil and had it 
attested by his secretary and a lawyer who occupied space 
in the same suite. 
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The trial court found that the first codicil was the 
product of domination and influence of Macfarlane. It is 
to be noted that the court did not find that the first codicil 
in which Kostopulos was named a beneficiary was the 
product of domination and influence of Macfarlane and 
Kostopulos but only that of Macfarlane, and still this Hon-
orable Court affirmed the decision of the lower court as 
the same affected the first codicil. The trial court found 
as to the second codici~, the one in which appellant Ada 
bridge is named as beneficiary, that that codicil was the 
product of influence of Macfarlane and Kostopulos. It 
therefore appears that this Honorable Court has already 
spoken on the subject and that it would have applied the 
same rule of law as to the second codicil as it applied to 
the first codicil had an appeal been taken. Appel-
lants argue most strongly that, the evidence being to 
the effect that appellants Bridges were not present 
at the execution of the second codicil and the court 
not having found that the second codicil was the prod-
uct of domination and influence of Bridges, this Hon· 
orable Court would have reversed the trial court because of 
such finding, but the ruling of this Honorable Court, as 
made against Kostopulos' appeal does not and will not sup· 
port such argument. 
Appellants further argue that there was no showing by 
the record as to any bad motive on the part of appellants 
to gain Gail Swan's property, nothing but acts of kindness. 
However one need only compare the many more and con· 
tinuous acts of kindness over a much longer period of time 
rendered by Kostopulos than were shown to have been ren· 
dered by the Bridges and still the trial court held and it was 
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affirmed by this Honorable Court that such acts were 
for the purpose of influencing the will and thus benefiting 
under the codicils to the will of Gail Swan. Evidently the 
trial court was not favorably impressed with that evidence 
on the part of appellants Bridges, who, having friends of 
their own age and with the same interests, would leave their 
family of six children several nights each week to travel 
far to the home of Gail Swan to play cards with her. Gail 
Swan was old enough to have been the mother of Mrs. Bridge. 
It is further evident that the trial court also took notice 
of the fact that three of the persons whom Gail Swan told 
Drs. Drake and Nielsen she wanted named beneficiaries un-
der her will at the very time the second codicil was executed 
in their presence were not named, and that Ada Bridge 
whom Gail Swan did not mention to the two doctors, was 
named as a beneficiary. The court made a finding as to 
this. Finding No. 24 which refers to the testimony of Drs. 
Darke and Neilsen as follows: 
"They both testified that upon inquiry of Gail 
Swan as to who were to be beneficiaries under her will 
she gave them the name of Oscar Burside Beam, her 
brother-in-law, Harold Hendee, and Ada Bridge's 
husband, Joseph Lamar Bridge. All three persons so 
named by Gail Swan as she was about to sign the 
codicil were omitted from the codicil. The Court 
therefore finds that Gail Swan did not understand 
who was benefiting by the second codicil she had 
signed in Dr. Nielsen's office, and that the document 
which she signed did not give effect to the testamen-
tary intentions expressed by her to the doctors at the 
time she signed the codicils." 
The trial court further found, as is recited in the last 
part of finding No. 16, that the persistent attentions of the 
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Bridges to Gail were motivated by a desire to gain her trust 
and confidence in the hope of profiting from such a show of 
kindness. And the court also found that Gail Swan's mind 
was childish and undeveloped, that she was emotionally im-
mature and highly susceptible to any show of kindness and 
friendship. 
Those findings are amply supported by the evidence, 
excerpts of which are attached to respondents' Motion for 
Summary Judgment, a portion of which we find as follows: 
Mrs. Hendee (Gail Swan's sister) testified that 
Gail had little schooling and that she was ill most of 
the time ( R 95, 96, 97, 98) She never had any chums, 
no dates, parties, nor associates or social contacts. 
( R 103) She read funny papers, but no other books 
( R 112) She was very susceptible to doing those things 
that people told her to do. (R 134) 
It is apparent from the evidence that Gail Swan left 
only the sum of $100 to her "beloved" aunt, Mrs. Mortsolf 
whom Gail thought much of. Mrs. Hendee changed her copy 
of the will which Mrs. Hendee furnished to Mrs. Mortsolf 
from $100 to $100 per month. 
Mrs. Mortsolf testified to the fact that Gail lived 
with her in California for a period of time (R 262) 
and that she (Mrs. Mortsolf) lived with Gail and Gail's 
father for five months in Salt Lake City, that Gail was 
like her child, that she had the mind of a child 
(R 263). Then after Gail's father died Mrs. Mort-
sol£ came back to Salt Lake City and lived with Gail 
two or three times each year and usually stayed for six 
weeks time. Mrs. Mortsolf read light books to Gail, 
Gail did not read ( R 266) . Gail helped a little with 
cooking, could set table only if told and reminded 
(R 267). Gail could not get a meal (R 267). 
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Mrs. Mortsolf further testified that Bridges were 
frequent visitors and became very intimate. Mr. 
Bridge always came and greeted Gail, kissing and 
hugging her and making a fuss over her until it be-
came embarrassing to Mrs. Mortsolf ( R2 77) Gail 
was much more interested in men than in women. ( R 
280) . On buses Gail would hang over the driver and 
talk with him to such extent that it was embarrassing 
to Mrs. Mortsolf. Gail would also invite police-
men and ball players to her home. She said 
Gail believed in everybody. She had that child-
like belief those people have ( R 281). Mrs. 
Mortsolf further testified that Gail was never normal, 
never grown up (R 284). Gail couldn't dress her-
self or comb her hair (R 292). 
Clair Mortensen, Trust Officer of Walker Bank 
& Trust Company called as a witness on behalf of the 
proponents of the Will and codicils who had charge of 
Gail Swan's business for considerable time testified 
that Gail did not have a normal adult mind, (R 495) 
that as to certain things she had an adult understand-
ing, as to other things she was probably of the age of 
12 to 15. Gail's ability to read and write and mathe-
matics about fourth grade. ( R 496) Mr. Mortensen 
discussed Gail's business with her sister (Mrs. Hen-
dee) in setting up a budget of $300. (R 503) He 
testified that he saw the girls together (Mrs. Hendee 
and Gail), that the difference between them was that 
Mrs. Hendee was mentally an adult and mentally 
mature. (R 505) 
Dr. Darke testified that Gail's mental condi-
tion was that of a 12 year old. (R 808) That she 
failed to mature mentally and emotionally. (R 812) 
Dr. Pace testified that Gail was not feeble mind-
ed but was of a low average intelligence. ( R 824) 
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That she was emotionally immature, that persons of 
immature mind and immature emotions would be 
more likely susceptible to influence and suggestion 
than those of mature mind. Gail was definitely 
below average. (R 829) 
Grace Folden, a nurse testified that she attended 
Gail Swan for approximately 8 months in 1950 
(R 349). That Gail was under sedatives most of the 
time ( R 408) . Gail was like a baby, couldn't dress 
herself ( R 402). Bridges came as much as three 
times a week, they were very affectionate toward 
Gail. Gail's mental development was just like a 
child (R 413). Only once tried to play Canasta when 
Mrs. Folden was there, she could not play cards. 
Mrs. Bridge would sit in at one side, Miss Folden 
would sit in for Mrs. Bridge. Mr. Beam and Mr. 
Bridge would just give Gail the cards. (R 434) 
Dr. Joseph Emory Frank who treated Gail from 
1950 to time of her death testified that she was always 
in a drowsy mood due to phenobarbital, she was given 
daily treatments of mesantoin and phenobarbital. 
Dr. Frank told Macfarlane and Kostopulos he thought 
Gail should have a guardian appointed. (R 364) He 
further testified that Gail was not a mental adult. 
(R 375) 
The record contains much more evidence supporting 
the trial Court's finding as against the second codicil as the 
same pertains to appellant Ada Bridge, but we will not en· 
cumber the record with more than that hereinabove set out, 
it being respondents' contention that even if there were no 
more in the record than that which is herein pointed out it is 
clearly shown that the findings were supported by the evi· 
dence. 
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It is evident, from the decision of this Honorable Court 
in the Kostopulos appeal, in its having affirmed the decision 
of the lower court in denying probate of the first codicil that 
the person or persons influencing the making of the will or 
codicil need not be present, and they need not take part in 
the preparation or execution of the instrument. 
It is also evident that the trial court gave appellant, 
Ada Bridge's case much thought and due consideration be-
fore rendering its decision against her. The court concluded 
that Gail Swan was not acting freely and without domina-
tion of Kostopulos and Macfarlane. This argument is fully 
supported by that part of the Court's memorandum decision 
quoted from by appellants herein in their brief at pages 35 
and 36 wherein the court said: 
"If Wilda Gail Swan had been permitted to dis-
pose of her property free from the domination of 
Kostopulos and Macfarlane, so that her meager men-
tal capacity might have been freely exercised, and 
if under such circumstances she had made the be-
quest to Ada Bridge which is here under attack, I 
would be strongly inclined to sustain that bequest." 
"I feel constrained to find that the Will and 
Codicils are entirely void, because of the circum-
stances and in the setting in which they were signed. 
I do not believe that Wilda Gail Swan had the testa-
mentary capacity to give effect to her own will and 
desires as to the disposition of her property." (Italics 
supplied) 
The next paragraph of the memorandum decision from 
page 36 of appellants' brief is most important to respondents' 
position inasmuch as appellants argue so strongly that be-
cause this Honorable Court found that the testatrix had 
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mental capacity to make a will in the Macfarlane and Kos-
topulos appeals this court would have reversed the trial 
court had Ada Bridge perfected her appeal. That portion 
of the memorandum decision referred to is as follows: 
"But even if she had Testamentary capacity, con-
sidered in the abstract, her childish mind was so eas-
ily dominated and she was so completely under the 
influence of Macfarlane and Kostopulos, who fraud-
ulently employed their influence to bring about the 
signing of the documents under attack, and the docu-
ments were so far contaminated by fraud and undue 
influence, that they must be declared null and void 
in their entirety." 
We think it is clearly evident from the above statement 
of the trial court that the court did not necessarily mean 
that Macfarlane and Kostopulos influenced the making of the 
codicil in favor of the appellant, Ada Bridge hut that they so 
wholly dominated the testatrix's mind that she did not act 
and was not acting freely. This conclusion is further sup· 
ported by the trial court's finding as against Kostopulos 
~s to the- first codicil when Kostopulos was not present and 
took no part in the preparation and execution of that instru-
ment but which instrument was prepared by Macfarlane in 
his office. The trial court concluded that Wilda Gail Swan 
was so far dominated by the influence of Macfarlane that he 
was able to and did substitute his will for hers and that 
therefore the instrument (first codicil) was a product of 
undue influence exercised by Grant Macfarlane at the time 
he prepared the same and at the time Gail Swan signed the 
same, (see Conclusion No. 4 hereinbefore set out in full) 
and this Honorable Court as heretofore stated, affirmed 
that decision not only as against Macfarlane but also as 
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against Kosptopulos. Such reasoning is further supported 
by the trial court's finding No. 24 also herein above fully set 
forth wherein the court took into consideration the fact that 
certain parties mentioned by the testatrix to the doctors at 
the very time she was executing the second codicil were not 
named in the instrument and Ada Bridge who was not men-
tioned by the testatrix to the doctors was named therein. 
It is apparent that had the trial court found Gail Swan 
to have been competent to make a will and codicil still the 
court would have found the same were so contaminated 
by fraud and influence that he would have declared them 
null and void. 
Based on such reasoning, which is sound, we think this 
Honorable Court would have affirmed the lower court as to 
fraud and influence as same pertained to the Ada Bridge 
bequest had the appeal of Ada Bridge been taken, as it did 
the Macfarlane and Kostopulos appeals. 
At page 40 of appellants' brief appellants quote a por-
tion of the dicta of this court in its reported decision in the 
Swan case as found on page 687, but appellants do not quote 
that portion of the same paragraph wherein this Honorable 
Court further said: 
"On the other hand, the fact that her mentality was 
below the normal mature person and her desire for so-
cial contact indicated she might be an easy prey to 
fraud and undue influence." 
It is fair to presume that this conclusion influenced 
the decision of this Honorable Court in its affirming the lower 
court as to that part of the case before it oil appeal. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
20 
Furthermore the following points should he horne in 
mind: 
First, in order to prevail in this case, the appellants 
must establish, to the satisfaction of the Trial Court, that 
the Supreme Court would have reversed (not might have 
reversed) the Trial Court in the Swan case, as to Ada 
Bridge, if her appeal had been perfected. 
Second, the determination of this question must be 
based, not on new evidence, nor upon a retrial of the Swan 
case, but upon the record of the Swan case which was before 
the Trial Court when the Motion for Summary Judgment was 
argued. 
Third, this was a question which the Trial Court in 
this case determined upon the basis of the evidence in the 
Swan case, then before it. 
Fourth, this determination of the Trial Court should 
not he overturned, if there is competent evidence to sustain 
the Trial Court's decision; and we submit that there is such 
evidence in abundance. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary we submit the following: 
I. There was no express agreement on the part of the 
respondents to appeal the case of appellant, Ada Bridge. 
2. Even if the alleged conversation between appel-
lants and respondent, LeGrand P. Backman, as to such al-
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leged agreement, is accepted as true, the appellants, by their 
own admissions, failed to pay the $100.00 which they agreed 
to pay for briefs, within the time allowed for appeal. 
3. The Court has ruled heretofore in the Swan case 
that the first codicil was void as to both Kostopulos and 
Macfarlane, even though Kostopulos was not present when 
the said codicil was executed or written, and even though 
the influence of Macfarlane alone existed in its prepara-
tion. This Court, therefore, should not apply a different 
rule as to the conditions of the appeal with respect to the 
second codicil. 
4. There was competent evidence to sustain the find-
ing that the second codicil under which the appellant, Ada 
Bridge, would take was null and void, because of the 
domination of the testator by Kostopulos and Macfarlane; 
and it cannot be said, therefore, as a matter of law that 
this Court would have reversed the Trial Court upon this 
point, or that the Trial Court erred in granting the Motion 
for Summary Judgment. 
We humbly submit that any one of the above four 
points would be sufficient to justify this Honorable Court in 
sustaining the decision of the Trial Court in granting re-
spondents' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROMNEY & NELSON 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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